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Homosexual Single Individuals’ Right to Adopt Before the
European Court of Human Rights and in the French Legal Context
by Elena Falletti*

T

Introduction

occupy in the child’s life” and “the lack of a paternal referent”
in her household.3

his article illustrates how the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) reversed its jurisprudence on adoption
by single homosexual individuals, and describes the
consequences of this decision within the French legal system.1
The decision in E.B. v. France concerns the case of Ms. E.B.,
a French lesbian woman against whom France discriminated
in violation of Articles 8 (right
to respect for private and family life) and 14 (prohibition of
discrimination) of the European
Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR). After French family
courts and administrative agencies denied her adoption application and successive appeals on
the grounds of her sexual orientation, Ms. E.B. filed a petition
before the ECtHR. Following
her victory in the supranational
court, a domestic administrative
tribunal granted Ms. E.B. a new
trial and allowed her to adopt a
child – surprisingly, not based
on human rights principles, but
rather on a subjective assessment of the life of the future
adoptive parent.

Although French law provides that an unmarried person is
entitled to file an application for adoption, and despite her positive personal qualities and teaching experience, both the administrative institutions and the courts rejected Ms. E.B.’s application
up to the Conseil d’Etat, the highest French administrative court.
After exhausting all domestic
remedies, Ms. E.B. submitted a
petition to the ECtHR claiming
violations of Articles 8 and 14
of the ECHR on account of the
discrimination by the French
administrative authorities due
to her declared homosexuality.
In holding that France had violated these articles of the ECHR
in its treatment of Ms. E.B.,
the ECtHR reversed its earlier
precedent regarding adoption
by homosexual individuals.

The court’s decision in
Fretté reached no consensus
on homosexual individuals’
right to adopt, thereby
allowing states a wide
margin of appreciation – a
precedent that would be
substantially changed in E.B.

The Case Law of the
European Court of
Human Rights in Same-sex
Adoption Prior to E.B.

Before the case of E.B.,
the most relevant decision of
the ECtHR in same-sex adoption pertaining was Fretté v.
France,4 which concerned a
man who requested to adopt a child after several unsuccessful
attempts to have a child with a female friend. French Social
Services described Mr. Fretté positively, but emphasized that he
was not ready to organize his new life around a child and the
related responsibilities. They also noted that he had no one to fill
the maternal role in his family.5 After exhausting domestic remedies, Mr. Fretté petitioned the ECtHR alleging that France violated Articles 6 (right to a fair trial), 8, and 14 of the ECHR by
interfering with his family and private life and for discriminating
against him based on his homosexuality. By a four-to-three vote,
the ECtHR found no violation of the ECHR.

In French law it is possible
for unmarried people to adopt
children. Those children can
assume the legal status of natural children of the adoptive parent.2 Ms. E.B., a single woman, applied to adopt a child under
the French Civil Code. When she signed the application, on
February 26, 1998, she was 37 years old. She had been a kindergarten teacher for thirteen years, and had been in a homosexual
relationship with her partner for eight years. All these circumstances were disclosed in her adoption application. After about
six months, Ms. E.B. received a first denial of her adoption
application from the administrative authorities. The reasoning
for the refusal included both “the place [her] partner would
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The court’s decision in Fretté reached no consensus on homosexual individuals’ right to adopt, thereby allowing states a wide
margin of appreciation – a precedent that would be substantially
changed in E.B. In Fretté, the ECtHR stated that States Parties
to the ECHR enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in deciding
26

The court in Fretté found that the French government’s stated
reasons for the conduct of domestic authorities was justified
because of converging interests of the applicant to adopt a child,
and the child’s interest in being adopted. The ECtHR emphasized the importance of the affective and emotional relationship
created through adoption, noting that the interest of the child7
must be the predominant factor. In Fretté, the French domestic
court8 noted that the education provided by same-sex parents,
and the absence of a maternal role model may have negative consequences.9 The ECtHR noted the lack of consensus within the
scientific debate about these consequences, especially among
psychiatrists and psychologists.10 The ECtHR also cited deep
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which differences justify different treatment. This margin of
appreciation may vary depending on the presence, or absence, of
a consensus view on a legal issue, such as adoption, in Member
States. In Fretté, the ECtHR observed that the margin of appreciation for homosexual couples to adopt children was wide due
to lack of such consensus. As a result, the ECtHR left Member
States free to decide how to regulate this issue.6 To avoid abuse,
the ECtHR reserves the right to evaluate conformity of domestic
decisions to Article 14 of the ECHR.

The European Court of Human Rights.

Based on these domestic guidelines, on February 24, 2000,
the Administrative Court of Besançon (Administrative Court)
approved Ms. E.B.’s application.19 The Administrative Court held
that the Children’s Welfare Service and the Adoption Board’s
orders denying her application to adopt did not legally justify

The European Convention of Human Rights is a living
instrument, and is adaptable to moral and social evolution
in modern times. . . . However, despite Member States’
domestic laws on adoption by single individuals, discrimination based on an applicant’s sexual orientation is not allowed.
division in national and international public opinion. For these
reasons, the ECtHR held that a wide margin of appreciation did
not infringe on the principle of proportionality that the ECHR11
accords to Member States.

rejection of the application. Because Ms. E.B. was a teacher
who enjoyed social relationships and showed good familial, educational, and psychological qualities, the Administrative Court
determined that she was fit to adopt a child.
However, the public authorities reviewing the adoption
appealed to the Nancy Administrative Court of Second Instance
(Nancy Administrative Court), which, in its judgment on
December 21, 2000, reversed the Administrative Court’s decision granting custody. The Nancy Administrative Court held that
Ms. E.B.’s personal situation presented two grounds for rejection: first, the absence of a male parental role model capable of
fostering an adopted child’s development,20 and second, the lack
of sufficient clarity about the place that the applicant’s female
partner would occupy in the child’s life.21

A Concise Overview of French Adoption Law
In E.B. v. France, the ECtHR interpreted the application
of French laws,12 including Article 343 of the Civil Code,13
Articles 63 and 100-3 of the Family and Social Welfare Code,
and Articles 1, 4 and 5 of Decree no. 98-771 of September 1,
1998, establishing the criteria for evaluating adoption applications for children in state care.14 These laws affirm that a couple
married longer than two years and not legally separated, where
both spouses are over twenty-eight years old, may apply to adopt
a child.15 Article 343-1 of the Civil Code states that a single
person over twenty-eight years of age may also apply for adoption.16 In addition, Article 63 of the Family and Social Welfare
Code17 affirmed that a person who has custody and established
emotional ties to a child is authorized to adopt the child.18
Articles 1, 4 and 5 of Decree no. 98-771 provide guidelines for
adoption.

Ms. E.B. appealed this decision to the highest French administrative authority, the Conseil d’Etat, which rejected her appeal
on June 5, 2002, citing the same two justifications as the Nancy
Administrative Court.22 According to the French administrative judges, the public authorities had to consider Ms. E.B.’s
sexual orientation when evaluating the needs and interests of
27

In E.B., the ECtHR affirms an important principle of
law: because sexual behavior concerns very intimate and
personal choices, ‘where sexual orientation is in issue,
there is a need for particularly convincing and weighty
reasons to justify a difference in treatment regarding
rights falling within Article 8 of the ECHR.’
the adopted child. The Conseil d´Etat further held that barring
Ms. E.B.’s application to adopt did not violate Articles 8 and 14
of the ECHR or Article 225-1 of the Criminal Code forbidding
sexual discrimination.23

In both domestic and international law, the best interest of the
child is the paramount consideration for all adoption applicants:
individuals, couples, homosexuals, and heterosexuals. Judge
Zupančič’s dissenting opinion argued that the applicant should
have submitted “statistical proof . . . that the French administrative authorities systematically discriminate against lesbian
women wishing to adopt a child.”29 Judge Loucaides’s dissenting opinion asserts that sexuality is not a protected status under
Article 14 of the ECHR.30

Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights
The ECHR is a living instrument, and is adaptable to moral
and social evolution in modern times. Neither the ECHR nor
ECtHR jurisprudence provides mandatory rules for adoption.
However, despite Member States’ domestic laws on adoption by
single individuals, discrimination based on an applicant’s sexual
orientation is not allowed.

Fundamentally, the ECtHR’s decision in E.B. establishes that
domestic authorities’ evaluation of a married or unmarried individual’s application to adopt may not be based on the applicant’s
sexual orientation.31 The decision is a striking departure from
the ECtHR’s earlier precedent from Fretté, where reaching a
consensus opinion on homosexual adoption was inconceivable.

In E.B., the ECtHR affirms an important principle of law:
because sexual behavior concerns very intimate and personal
choices, “where sexual orientation is in issue, there is a need for
particularly convincing and weighty reasons to justify a difference in treatment regarding rights falling within Article 8 of the
ECHR.”24 The ECtHR highlights that this case did not concern

The Final French Court Decision on the E.B. Case
After the decision of the ECtHR in E.B., on April 28, 2008,
Ms. E.B. once again petitioned to adopt a child. Nevertheless,
on January 26, 2009, French administrative authorities rejected
her petition. Ms. E.B. then appealed to the French Equal
Opportunities and Anti-Discrimination Commission32 (Haute
Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’Égalité
(HALDE)) on the following grounds: first, that she suffered
discrimination because of her sexual orientation, despite the
fact that she clearly met the legal requirements to adopt a child;
second, that she had informed the Social Services of her samesex relationship with Ms. R.; third, that psychological and social
reports had given a favorable opinion of Ms. E.B.’s adoption
application.33

an application for authorisation to adopt by a – married or unmarried – couple, but by a single person. In
the Court’s view, that ground might therefore have led
to an arbitrary refusal and have served as a pretext for
rejecting the applicant’s application on grounds of her
homosexuality.25
The ECtHR otherwise found the applicant to have
“‘undoubted personal qualities and an aptitude for bringing up
children,’ which were assuredly in the child’s best interests, a key
notion in the relevant international instruments.”26
Because of the complexity of the case, it is appropriate to
explain the ECtHR’s concurring and dissenting opinions. The
ECtHR found a violation of Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR by
a ten-to-seven vote. The compensation award of €10,000 against
the French government was approved by an eleven-to-six vote.
Judge Costa’s dissenting opinion states that there is no explicit
right to adopt under the ECHR and finds that, while domestic
authorities may not cite the lack of a “paternal” figure, the
applicant’s partner’s attitude is a legitimate criterion for refusing adoption.27 Judge Mularoni’s dissenting opinion argues
that denial based on the absence of a “paternal referent” for the
adopted child is not a violation of Article 14 of the ECHR.28

The French administrative authority (le Président du Conseil
général du Jura) argued that Ms. E.B. could not adopt a child,
citing new reasons, including the significant age difference
between her, her partner, and the child, as well as her partner’s limited involvement in the adoption proceedings.34 The
President of the Conseil Général du Jura (Jura General Council)
found Ms. R.’s alleged lack of interest significant, stating: “As
a matter of fact, Ms. R. shows low emotional involvement with
the child and she had a third-party role in the ‘mother-child’
relationship.”35
28

However, in reviewing the Jura General Council’s decision, on October 5, 2009, HALDE noted that the Jura General
Council’s arguments were ill founded, but were not overtly
discriminatory. HALDE found the presumption that Ms. R. was
disinterested in the adoption proceeding was unfounded, because
Ms. R. participated in all interviews during the proceedings.36
Furthermore, the psychological reports issued by Social Services
stated that Ms. E.B. and Ms. R.
were “a really complementary
couple,” who “express that they
both want a child.”37
Because Ms. R. was not the
principal candidate for adoption, her marginal involvement
in the adoption procedure was
justified.38 On these facts the
Administrative Tribunal of
Besançon erred by evaluating Ms. E.B. and Ms. R. as if
they were a heterosexual couple involved in a civil union
(PACS)39 or a marriage, and not
as a single woman who wanted
to adopt a child with the support
of her same-sex partner.

despite psychological and social reports regarding the professional and personal qualifications of the claimant. For these
reasons, HALDE stated that the Jura General Council’s decision
is contaminated by discrimination in violation of Articles 8 and
14 of the ECHR. These facts led HALDE to overturn the Jura
General Council’s decision that upheld the denial of Ms. E.B.’s
adoption petition.45 Ultimately, the Administrative Tribunal of
Besançon issued a new decision
that approved Ms. E.B.’s application for adoption based on positive psychological reports.46 Ms.
E.B. can now adopt a child.

Fundamentally, the
ECtHR’s decision in E.B.
establishes that, whether
domestic authorities
approve an unmarried
individual’s application to
adopt, the decision may not
be based on the applicant’s
sexual orientation.

Conclusions

The E.B. case confirms
that the margin of appreciation afforded to Member States
in their evaluation of adoption
applications is limited by the
requirement of an “objective
and reasonable justification”
for refusal.47 Indeed, a refusal
may not be based on a prospective parent’s sexual orientation. The ultimate domestic
resolution of the E.B. case
additionally reveals an interesting and controversial practice:
the Administrative Tribunal
of Besançon implemented the
ECtHR’s judgment based on
recognition of specific personal
circumstances related to the applicant, not on the fundamental
right of non-discrimination. The Administrative Tribunal of
Besançon did not refer to the ECtHR’s judgment in its legal reasoning, but instead relied on HALDE’s decision. Still, HALDE
specifically cited the ECtHR’s judgment in its own decision. In
this way, the ECtHR’s decision influenced the final result of the
French judges, even if it was not part of their legal reasoning.

Based on this error, French
authorities demanded the
involvement of the applicant’s
lesbian partner because she
lived with Ms. E.B. and could
influence the adopted child. The
HALDE decision compared Ms. E.B.’s application with similar
adoptions made by single women involved in heterosexual relationships. HALDE made this comparison to illuminate the discriminatory nature of the Administrative Tribunal of Besançon’s
argument.40 According to French authorities, the stability
and strength of the adoptive couple are matters of the utmost
importance.41

Recent social developments including divorce and France’s
PACS42 have fostered an epochal change in the traditional idea
of family. In this context, HALDE held that if the French Civil
Code recognizes the legal right of individuals to adopt children,
Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR protect this possibility for all
individuals.43 While there is no right to adopt a child under the
ECHR, each application for adoption must be judged in keeping with Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR. Even if discrimination
based on sexuality is not explicitly prohibited by the ECHR, the
ECtHR’s case law specifies that the list of human rights recognized in the ECHR is not exhaustive.44

The ECtHR’s decision in E.B. is of fundamental importance.
It requires Member States to move past prejudices against adoption applicants based on their sexual orientation, a characteristic
that is wholly unrelated to an individual’s parenting capabilities.
Ms. E.B. was successful in her work as an educator of children
and was recognized as a good teacher by French authorities,
independent of her sexual orientation. The refusal of her request
for adoption constituted discrimination based solely on abstract
categories, directly contrary to Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR.48
The ECtHR’s decision in E.B. makes clear that States Parties to
the ECHR are free, within their margin of appreciation, to prohibit the adoption of children by unmarried people, but may not
do so based on sexual orientation. HRB

Nevertheless, the decisions of the French courts at issue in the
E.B. case seem to be founded only upon her sexual orientation,
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